Rational play of a game implies that a player chooses strategies that maximize his payoff given his beliefs over his opponents' strategies. A Nash equilibrium is a choice of strategies such that the expectations are fulfilled. There are two problems with the concept of Nash equilibrium. First, there is no explanation of how the players end up with beliefs that are self fulfilled. Second, the definition of Nash equilibrium does not discriminate between beliefs that are more and those that are less likely to occur. This leads to a great number of Nash equilibria and thus reduces the usefulness of the equilibrium concept 1.
One way of solving these problems is to examine the situation where individuals play a particular game repeatedly. (Indeed a game of any interest is one that will be played quite often.) Players start with a belief of how the other players will act and update their beliefs after each stage of the game. An equilibrium of this system will be an invariant distribution of strategies among the set of players. Such equilibria will be justified by some learning process and will discriminate between beliefs that are more likely and less likely to prevail. This approach to the problem is not novel. Cournot examined a model where each player assumes that the other players will select the strategy they selected in the previous round and maximizes his payoff accordingly. Pure strategy equilibria of this process will be Nash equilibria. Another process that has been analyzes is the so-called fictitious play (see Brown (1951) , Robinson (1951) , Shapley (1964) , Brock, Marimon, Rust and Sargent (1988) ). The process assumes that an individual has Dirichlet priors over his opponents' strategies and that at each round the player updates his beliefs according to Bayes' rules. It turns out that these assumptions are equivalent to assuming that each player has beliefs that are a convex combination of his initial belief and the empirical distribution.
Let us then start with an economist who has beliefs regarding the relative validity of the two hypotheses that humans update according to the fictitious play or the Cournot updating rule. We put full support over smeared versions of these hypotheses that allow errors with some probability. We shall discuss the details of that smearing procedure and its implications in later sections of the paper. The economist observes a sequence of experiments where the experimental subjects played a repeated game. The experimenter then uses Bayes' rule to update his beliefs about the two hypotheses given the data from all the experiments. Since the experiments are very different in terms of payoffs and designs, combining all the data to compute a single likelihood function is not possible. Moreover, the sequential approach that we use in this paper (computing a likelihood function for each experiment separately, and sequentially using Bayes' rule) cannot be implemented in a classical framework since the distribution of the maximum likelihood statistic will be unknown given the previous experiments.
Two points make our method of combining experiments especially valu able. The fi rst is the fact that the order in which we update the economist's beliefs (and hence the order in which the experiments are observed) does not matter. This is not surprising in the least, but we have a rigorous statement of that result in section 4 for completeness. The other point is that empir ically, some of the 9 experiments that we use for updating actually point strongly in favor of the Cournot process which the overall analysis strongly suggests to be less likely than fictitious play. Figure 1 is a plot of the economist's posterior as a function of his prior and the smearing parameter f to be explained later. For now, just look at the posterior over the smeared fictitious play hypothesis (the height of the graph) at different values of the prior over that hypothesis at small (say less that .5) values off. At f = 0, the hypothesis is strictly fictitious play (and we cannot compute the posterior), and for positive values, f is the probability that any particular person in any particular stage of any particular experiment gets to choose his action purely randomly. It is clear that the posterior for most reasonable values of epsilon and for all positive priors is very close to unity, and hence we are inclined to think that the smeared fictitious play hypothesis is infi nitely more likely than the smeared Cournot hypothesis.
The rest of this paper builds up and justifies the necessary machinery to achieve Figure 1 . Section 2 will discuss one class of games three of which we studied, Section 3 will discuss the other class of games, six of which we studied. Section 4 will discuss and justify the econometric procedure that we follow, and the paper will end with a series of 9 appendices for the nine experiments.
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Games with one opponent
This section is based on some experiments that were run by Knott and Miller (1987) . In this series of three experiments (labeled A, B, and C), each of which has individuals matched in pairs and play the games reproduced in Figures 2, 3 , and 4 respectively ten times. Thus, for instance, if in a given repetition of game A, an individual selects strategy 52 while his opponent selects strategy 51 then the individual receives 200 pennies.
For each experiment, all the interesting aspects of the theoretical and ob served behavior is depicted in a separate appendix. For instance, Appendix A deals with experiment A, Appendix B with experiment B and Appendix C with experiment C. In each appendix, the first two figures show a Monte Carlo distribution of actions in each of the ten stages of the game. Specifi cally, in Appendix A, Figure 11 displays the simulated distribution of those plays under Cournot updating. To obtain this distribution, we simulate 1000 pairs (2000 individuals) and endow them with randomly drawn (unif o rm over the unit simplex) initial priors over their opponents' possible actions. Fig  ure 11 shows the obtained empirical distribution. We then let each pair go through the 10 stages of the game where they are made to update according to the Cournot rule. Similarly, Figure 12 shows the distribution obtained by running a similar simulation except that the agents are made to update using the fictitious play rule. The third figure in each appendix shows the actual observed proportions of play of each action in each period. For example Fig  ure 13 shows the proportion of times that each of the 15 actions was played in each of the ten periods. The proportion here is taken over the 8 pairs (16 individuals) that played the game in experiment A. The fourth figure in each appendix is the result of our econometric analysis of each individual experiment which will be explained in section 4. Notice that each game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium: (S14,S14) for experiments A and experiment B and (S7,S7) for experiment C. Notice also that both the Cournot process and fictitious play converge to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium and that the convergence of fictitious play is much slower. The behavior of the subjects in the three experiment is very similar to fictitious play: subjects seem to converge to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium at a somewhat slower rate than fictitious play.
This section is based on some experiments that were run by Cooper, DeJong Forsythe, and Ross (1990) . In each experiment, there are eleven players. Each player plays twice against each of the other players where the match ings in each round are determined at random. Agents do not know the identity of the player they are matched with and after each play find out which strategy the opponent selected. We analyze 6 of the experiments run by the authors. These experiments are labeled experiment 3 through 8, and the payoff matrices are depicted in Figures 5 through 10. The structure of appendices 3 through 8 is identical to that of appendices A through C, with the first three figures in each appendix depicting the simulated proportion under Cournot, the simulated proportion under fictitious play, and the ob served proportions respectively. Notice in the third figure of each appendix that there are only three strategies; the fourth strategy was only mandated by the limitations of our graphics package.
In simulating the 1000 experiments for each of the hypotheses and each of the experiments, we actually drew 1000 ensembles of 11 agents and en dowed each of them with an initial belief that is drawn uniformly over the unit simplex. We then replicated the exact matching scheme that occurred in each experiment keeping track of the beliefs of all 11 individuals in our simulated ensemble. For each experiment, then, we followed the full evolu tion of actions and beliefs for the 11 simulated individuals for a total of 1000 ensembles. The depicted simulated distributions for Cournot and fictitious play in appendices 3 through 8 are the empirical distribution over 1000 en sembles where the individuals were made to update according to the Cournot rules or the fictitious play rules as the fi gure states. and (S2,S2). Suppose that n; players select strategy Si at a given period and suppose that players select strategies according to the Cournot process. Then all the players that were matched with players that selected strategies Sl and S3 will assign probability 1 that their next opponent selects strategy Sl and S3 and thus will select strategy Sl. Similarly, all players that are matched with players selecting strategy S2 will select strategy S2. Thus in any period t ::'.: 2, n1 + n3 individuals select strategy Sl and n2 individuals select strategy S2. Thus the only difference in the Cournot processes corre sponding to different payoff matrices is the proportion of initial beliefs that lead the players to selecting strategy Sl and strategy S2. In games 3,4,7,8 for almost all initial beliefs strategy Sl is a best response. Suppose an individual acts according to fictitious play. Suppose that an individual has the rare belief for which strategy S2 is a best response and is matched with another individual who adopts strategy Sl. Then the second individual increases the probability he assigns to other individuals selecting strategy S2 but not sufficiently to change his strategy choice. On the other hand the first individual increases his belief that individuals select strategy Sl and thus changes his strategy choice to 1. Thus in experiments 3,4,5,7,8, if fictitious play holds, the proportion of individuals that selects strategy Sl converges to 1.
Game 5 is similar to games 3,4, 7,8 excepts that for almost all beliefs an individual selects strategy S2 and thus the proportion of individuals that selects strategy S2 converges to 1.
In game 6 the proportion of initial beliefs for which strategy Sl and S2 are best responses are about equal. However strategy Sl is dominated by strategy S2 if strategy S3 is not played. Therefore when individuals behave according to fictitious play the proportion of individuals that selects strategy S2 converges to 1.
Boylan Ci El-Gama/, May 31, 1990 ______________ 9
The results of experiment 3,4 and 5 are consistent with fictitious play and the Cournot process since in the first two experiments the proportion of the subjects that selects strategy Sl seems to converge to 1 and in the third experiment the proportion of the individuals selecting strategy S2 seems to converge to 1.
In game 6 the two models make very different predictions: the Cournot process predicts that strategy Sl and strategy S2 are equally likely while fictitious play predicts convergence to strategy S2. The experimental data strongly favors fictitious play since the proportion of the subjects selecting strategy S2 seems to converge to 1.
The results of experiment 7,8 are inconsistent with both fictitious play and the Cournot process since both models predict that almost all subjects should select strategy Sl while in fact most of the subjects select strategy S2.
4
Econometric Analysis
The simulation procedure
In sections 2 and 3, we described the simulation procedure we used to get approximations of the likelihood function. There are two major questions that we expect the reader to ask:
1. In both experiments, why, the reader may ask, do we draw initial beliefs of all of our robots from the unif o rm distribution over the unit simplex? Surely, the reader may add, the distribution of beliefs should depend on the actual payoff matrix that the players get to observe. We totally agree with that statement. The problem with incorporating this type of theoretical analysis of the payoff matrix, however, should be obvious. For indeed it is the very game-theoretic contemplation of the payoff matrices that would convince us that all players should have point mass beliefs that their opponents will play the Nash strategy, and nothing other than Nash strategies should ever be observed. That clearly takes us back full circle and does not add to our knowledge of the justifiability of the notion of Nash equilibrium on the basis of different learning algorithms.
2. One alternative approach that we chose not to follow is to put our method on its head and start with an assumption about one particu lar learning algorithm being the true one, and then proceeding to get an estimate of the initial distribution of beliefs. This is the proce dure followed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1989) . It is clear that for our purposes, we are trying to find a reasonable learning algorithm, and assuming that agents actually follow any particular algorithm will be no more justified than assuming that they all play Nash in the first place. Also, once we use our data to estimate the initial distribution of beliefs (under some parametrization of course), we cannot update our beliefs on the truth of our maintained learning hypothesis.
3. A related question to the previous one is why we do not condition our simulations on the actual observed data. In other words, we could have the robots respond by updating to the actual moves that the human subjects used. The answer is quite simple. We want, for the purposes of our Bayesian updating, to compute the likelihood function under the maintained hypothesis that initial beliefs are drawn at random, and under our two alternative models. We then compare our prior beliefs on the two models with the (theoretically) simulated likelihood function and the observed data, and do our updating. Using the data in computing the likelihood function will interact with our assumption on the distribution of initial priors (and hence with the likelihood function) in ways that we cannot account for and would constitute a form of "data-mining".
The updating procedure
Now we go back to the issue of Bayesian updating of the economist's belief over the two hypotheses and discuss the derivation of the fourth figure of each appendix and the overall result of our analysis depicted in Figure 1 2 • Formally, let p� be the experimenter's subjective probability at time t that individuals act according to the Cournot process. Let p} be the experiment subjective probability at time t that individuals act according to fictitious 2The asymptotic aspects of the evolution of the economist's beliefs following that ap proach is discussed in more rigor and in more general contexts in El-Gamal and Sundaram (1989,1990) .
play. Let q � be the probability of observing the data at time t given that the individuals act according to the Cournot process. Let q } be the probability of observing the data at time t given that the individuals act according to fictitious play. The experimenter updates his beliefs according to Bayes' rule.
Then the posteriors, p;, p/ (t > 0), are determined from the priors, p � , P1 and the observations { q �, q }} in the manner described in the f o llowing lemma. An obvious corollary to this lemma is that the order with which the experiments are analyzed does not affect the belief of the experimenter. p �q i q; ... q � + l + p 1q }l q } ... q j +1 .
Thus the equalities hold for t = k + 1 and thus by induction f o r all integers t .
•
Smearing the hypotheses
If we were to put all of the probabilistic mass in our prior on rational agent theories, then a single observation which is inconsistent with all the the ories in the support of the prior will make Bayesian updating impossible (it will produce a zero numerator and denominator in the Bayesian updat ing formula). In the Cooper et al's experiments there are observations of agents playing strictly dominated actions which cannot be justified under any beliefs. There also observations of actions that, although not strictly dominated, cannot be justified under either of our learning algorithms. To make Bayesian updating applicable, we include in our models a small prob ability of a completely random action taking place. Specifically, we shall let each model predict actions based on the updating rule in question with probability (1 -E) and using a uniform (completely arbitrary) decision rule with probability E. We shall then examine the predictive power of the two models for different values of E. The argument f o r such a procedure (other than the fact that it allows us to do Bayesian updating) is that people early on in the experiment do not understand the experiment fully, in particular if they do not wish to spend the effort (the payoffs are not particularly high: a payoff of 600, f o r in stance, gives the subject a lottery with a probability .6 of winning one dollar). Cooper et al (1990) show that with time there is a statistically significant de crease in the number of times a dominated strategy is selected. Furthermore, individuals have different mental costs in figuring out the experiment. Thus there is a strong argument for a different error rate for each data point. The problem with this approach is that the error component then explains all the experimental data, and thus does not allow the experimenter to differentiate between the different theories. Thus we opted to select a single E for all out agents at all time periods. As the sample size gets large, the average 'correct' E will get small. Thus we will be interested in the validity of the model as E goes to zero. Alternatively, the value f o r E can be taken to be the average number of mistakes over the experiment.
The two models we compare are then the f o llowing:
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Model 2: a' = { �! with probability 1 -E with probability �'
where a' is the action chosen by the experimental subjects, ac is the action that maximizesj their expected payoff given their beliefs that are updated according to the Cournot procedure, a f is the same as ac with fictitious play updating, and a E { 1, 2, . .. , A} is any strategy.
The simulation results depicted in the previous sections give us Monte Cario approximations to the probability in each period of the experiment that a particular action will be played. Given those probabilities and the actual observed actions of the individuals in each period, we can compute Pr(datalModel i) and then proceed with Bayesian updating as described above. The computations we use for Pr( datalM ode/ i) will be reduced form in the following sense. We shall treat the actual action of an agent in a period as a data point which is assumed to be a random draw according the probability distribution obtained from the simulated experiments with probability (1 -e) and as a unif o rm random draw with probability L Let the observed data points be indexed by (n, t) E {1, 2, ... , N} x {1, 2, ... , T}, let the actions available to each individual n in period t be a E {1, 2, ... ,A} 3, and let the simulated probability under the pure version of A1 ode/ i of action a in period t be q � , t· Then
where an , t is the actual action chosen by agent n in period t.
Bad= { (n, t) E {1,. . ., N} X {1, ... , T}lqi a = 0 and q� a = O} , n,t , n,t and let Good be the set of points that can be explained by at least one of the theories; i.e., Good = ( {l,. .. , N} x {1, ... , T}) \ Bad. 3In general, A may depend on n and t, but since it does not in our experiments, we do not need to include this complication.
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Proof: Notice that
Then substituting in the Bayesian updating rule above, we can cancel the common factor ( � ) #(B ad) from the numerator and denominator. Thus Bayesian updating ignores these points; i.e.,
( TI ( 1 -E) ql,.n, +�).pi
The fourth fi gure in each of the nine appendices shows the posterior using the likelihood function f o r that experiment alone as a function of the economist's prior and the level of smearing €. As we discussed in the previous section the behavior of the subjects in the experiments ran by Knott and Miller is very similar to the one predicted by fictitious play. Notice that f o r reasonable values of E (i.e., less than sixty percent of the actions are caused by random error) and as long as the experimenter's priors put positive weight on fictitious play, then after seeing the outcome of any of the Knott and Miller's experiments the experimenter believes with probability very close to 1 that subjects act according to fictitious play.
In Cooper et al's experiments 3 the proportion of subjects that selects strategy Sl converges to 1 but at a much slower rate than fictitious play. Thus for reasonable values of E the experimenter's posteriors give probability very close to 1 to the event that subjects act according to the Cournot process. In experiment 4 subjects converge to strategy Sl at a faster rate; thus for small values of E (such as E = 0. 1) the experimenter posteriors put probability very close to 1 on the Cournot process. For high values of E (such as E = 0.4) the experimenter's posteriors will assing almost all the weight to fictitious play. Finally, intermediate values of E will give posteriors that put positive weight on both theories. In Cooper et al experiment 5 the proportion of the population that adopts strategy S2 converges very quickly to 1. The convergence is not quite as fast as the Cournot process and thus for any reasonable prior and reasonable value of E the posteriors put probability very close to 1 on fictitious play. Cooper et al's experiment 6 is by far the most interesting example since fictitious play and the Cournot dynamics are totally different. The behavior of the subject is very similar to fictitious play and thus not surprisingly the posteriors of the experimenter put probability very close to 1 on fictitious play.
In Cooper et al's experiments 7 and 8 the Cournot process and fictitious play indicate that almost all subjects should adopt strategy SL In fact almost all subjects adopt strategy S2. The posteriors after observing these experiments put probability very close to 1 on the Cournot process; however both models are clearly inadequate f o r this experiment. Overall, these results lead an experimenter to believe that fictitious play describes the data better than the Cournot process and this observation is represented in Figure 1 .
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